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ABSTRACT 
Labour market theory provides numerous reasons why mothers may earn lower hourly 
wages than non-mothers; however the empirical evidence for Australia is limited. This 
paper examines the effect of motherhood on Australian women‟s wages and wage growth 
using a series of panel data models which account for unobserved factors affecting both 
wage levels and wage growth. Using data from the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, an unexplained motherhood wage penalty of 
around five percent for one child, and nine percent for two or more children is found. 
Further analysis suggests that the wage penalty emerges over time through reduced wage 
growth, rather than through an immediate wage decline after birth. This reduction in wage 
growth is consistent with flatter wage profiles of part-time workers, discrimination and a 
reduction in mothers‟ work effort.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A large body of international literature has found an unexplained wage differential between 
mothers and non-mothers (e.g. Anderson, Binder and Krause, 2002; Buligescu et al., 2009; 
Drolet, 2002; Waldfogel, 1995); however the presence of a „motherhood wage penalty‟ in 
Australia is less clear. No study to date has examined the effect of motherhood on 
Australian women‟s wages taking account of unobserved factors, and the effect of 
motherhood on wage growth has not been assessed. 
Understanding the effect of children on women‟s wages and wage growth however is 
important to current Australian policy. The policy options for counteracting the fiscal effects 
of an ageing population centre on increasing birth rates whilst maintaining high levels of 
female labour force participation (LFP) (Australian Treasury Department, 2007). However 
to encourage both outcomes, it is important to determine how the presence of children 
affects mothers‟ wages, which in turn affects LFP.   
The effect of motherhood on wages is also important to the study of gender wage 
equality. The direct and indirect effects of children are often cited as a cause of the gender 
wage gap, and thus measuring the motherhood wage differential will shed light on this 
hypothesis (Waldfogel, 1998a).  
Finally, the opportunity costs born by mothers are of social importance; since good 
parenting provides positive externalities to the community, it has been argued that mothers 
disproportionately share the costs of childbearing (Budig and England, 2001). This is 
exacerbated when the costs of children go beyond the direct costs of food, clothing, health, 
education and shelter and include indirect opportunity costs of wages foregone.  
Motivated by the importance of the issue to Australian policy and the lack of prior 
research, this paper examines whether mothers, on average, earn lower hourly wages than 
non-mothers. Fixed effects estimates robust to time invariant unobserved factors are 
obtained using an unbalanced panel from the first seven waves of the Household Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The fixed effects results are compared 
to OLS and Heckman-corrected cross-sectional models to gauge the extent of heterogeneity 
and selection bias. Due to the absence of a suitable instrument, the analysis does not account 
for reverse causality.  
Whether the motherhood wage differential arises immediately after birth, or develops 
over time through wage growth is also investigated. The first-difference and fixed effects 
models of Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009), which account for the effect of unobserved 
heterogeneity on both the wage level and wage growth, are applied to the Australia data. 
While insightful, the methodology is sensitive to outlying wage growth observations, and is 
likely to be more useful as additional waves of HILDA are available.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the empirical literature and 
discusses the theoretical reasons for a motherhood wage penalty. Section III presents the 
empirical approach adopted in this paper and Section IV describes the HILDA data and 
sample. Finally, Section V presents the empirical results and Section VI concludes.  
II. EXISTING EVIDENCE AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A large body of international literature has studied whether mothers earn lower wages 
than non-mothers. A significant wage penalty has been found in the United States
2
, Britain 
(Waldfogel, 1995; 1998b), Canada (Drolet, 2002) and Germany (Buligescu et al., 2009).
3
 
While other studies in Denmark (Gupta and Smith, 2002) and Sweden (Albrecht et al., 
1999) have found motherhood or maternal leave to have no direct effect on wages.  
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 Such as: Anderson, Binder and Krause (2002; 2003), Baum (2002), Budig and England (2001),  Loughran 
and Zissimopoulos (2009), Lundberg and Rose (2000), Taniguchi (1999) and Waldfogel (1997; 1998b).  
3
 Most studies which found a motherhood wage penalty control for marital status in their analysis (for 
example, Anderson, Binder and Krause, 2002; 2003; Baum, 2002; Budig and England, 2001) which 
demonstrates that motherhood has a negative effect on wages, independent of the effects of marriage.  
Although the effects of children on wages may work indirectly through characteristics 
such as experience, tenure, education and job choices, most studies focus on estimating the 
direct effect of children. To that end, the „residual‟ motherhood penalty is typically 
estimated with human capital, job characteristics and time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity held constant. In studies which have found a residual penalty, estimates range 
from two percent (Baum, 2002; Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 2009) to nine percent 
(Waldfogel, 1995; 1998b) for one child and a further two (Anderson, Binder and Krause, 
2002; 2003) to nine percent (Budig and England, 2001) for additional children.  
In contrast to the large international literature, the effect of motherhood on wages or 
wage growth has received little attention in Australia. In fact, only two Australian studies 
(Krepp, 2007; Whitehouse, 2002) have sought to examine whether mothers earn lower 
hourly wages than non-mothers, and no Australian study to date has examined the effect of 
motherhood on wage growth. Using cross-sectional data from the Australian Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey in 1995, Whitehouse (2002) found no significant effect of 
dependant children on Australian women‟s wages. Similarly, Krepp (2007) found no 
residual wage penalty using a Heckman-corrected cross-sectional model to account for 
selection into employment. Although these Australian studies have found no direct effect of 
motherhood on wages, their results are potentially biased by unobserved heterogeneity and 
the omission of key controls.
4
  
Economic theory provides a number of non-mutually exclusive reasons why a raw wage 
differential between mothers and non-mothers may exist. Fore mostly, the greater frequency 
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 In Whitehouse‟s model, the coefficient of motherhood may be biased upward by the omission of experience 
if mothers in the sample are older than non-mothers, as the two categorical age variables included may not 
successfully control for the effect of aging on experience. Similarly, Krepp‟s models do not control for part-
time employment status; if mothers are more likely to work part-time jobs, and part-time work attracts a pay 
premium (Booth and Wood, 2008), the motherhood coefficient may be biased towards zero. Although Krepp 
accounts for selection into employment, her estimates may be biased by other unobserved factors correlated 
with both motherhood and wages (Anderson, Binder and Krause, 2002; 2003; Korenman and Neumark, 1992). 
and duration of work interruptions among mothers may reduce wages through foregone 
experience, depreciation of skills and loss of tenure.
5
 The anticipation of work interruptions 




The propensity of mothers to seek employment offering flexibility, part-time hours, 
maternity leave entitlements or limited travel time may also result in lower wages as a 
compensating differential (Rosen, 1986). Part-time work explains a large portion of the 
motherhood wage penalty in the United States (Waldfogel, 1997) and Britain (Joshi, Paci 
and Waldfogel, 1999), however Australian studies of part-time wages (Booth and Wood, 
2008; Rodgers, 2004) suggest that part-time work may not directly cause (or increase) a 
motherhood wage penalty. Nevertheless, working part-time may still affect Australian 
mothers‟ wages in the long run through lower human capital accumulation (due to less time 
spent working) and fewer opportunities for promotion (Abhayaratna et al., 2008). 
The effort required to raise children may also reduce mothers wages following 
Becker‟s (1985) „worker effort‟ hypothesis (Budig and England, 2001). However even 
between equally productive mothers and non-mothers a wage differential may arise through 
statistical discrimination if employers assume childcare and housework responsibilities 
make mothers less productive (Hyclak, Johnes and Thornton, 2005, p.384). It is also 
possible that employers with a prejudice against mothers will pay a wage below productivity 
by an amount sufficient to compensate for their taste for discrimination (Becker, 1957).   
Even in the absence of any direct or indirect effect of children on wages, a motherhood 
wage differential may be observed in OLS models if there are unobserved factors, such as 
work motivation, which are negatively correlated with the desire for children, and positively 
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 See Anderson, Binder and Krause (2002; 2003), Baum (2002), Budig and England (2001), Hill (1979), Joshi, 
Paci and Waldfogel (1999), Lundberg and Rose (2000), and Waldfogel (1995; 1997). 
6
 This effect is accentuated for mothers who expect to work part-time hours following the birth of a child. 
correlated with wages. On the other hand, the effect of motherhood on wages will be 
underestimated if those women most likely to experience a motherhood wage penalty are 
also the least likely to be employed. To account for these sources of bias, international 
studies have typically used panel data to estimate fixed effects models (e.g. Anderson, 
Binder and Krause, 2002; 2003; Budig and England, 2001; Lundberg and Rose, 2000).  
A few of studies have also addressed reverse causality between motherhood and wages 
with instrumental variables methods. This paper does not account for reverse causality as 
potential instruments are either not available in Australia or not possible given the sample 
size.
7
 The direction of possible reverse causality bias is not entirely clear. The motherhood 
penalty may be overstated if those women with lower wages, and hence a lower opportunity 
cost of leaving the workforce, are more likely to become mothers (Lundberg and Rose, 
2000, p.692). Alternatively, an increase in the wage rate may have a positive income effect 
on having a child (Ariza and Ugidos, 2007).  
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Women‟s wages are assumed to be determined according to the human capital model: 
1 2
1 2 3 4
ln 1 2it it it
it it it t i it
W Child Child
HC JC MS Year u
  
    
  
     
 
where itWln  is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage (in 2007 dollars) of woman i  
( 1,2,...,i N  ) in year t  ,...,T),t( 21 ; itChild1 and itChild2  are dummy variables 
equal to one if the woman has one or more children (and has a valid wage rate), and two or 
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 Instruments used in the motherhood penalty literature include father‟s and mother‟s education, whether the 
woman lived with her parents in adolescence (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2005; Neumark and Korenman, 
1994), the parent‟s educational goals for the woman, whether the woman‟s mother worked at age 14, the 
number of siblings (Neumark and Korenman, 1994; Simonsen and Skipper, 2006), the woman‟s past attitudes 
and her mother‟s family building history (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999). Instruments used in studies of 
motherhood and other labour market outcomes include state and county indicators of the cost of fertility and 
fertility control and laws on pregnancy termination (Klepinger, Lundberg and Plotnick, 1999), miscarriage 
(Hotz, Williams McElroy and Sanders, 2005), sex-mix of the first two children (Angrist and Evans, 1998) and 
twin births (Jacobsen, Wishart Pearce and Rosenbloom, 1999).  
(Equation 1) 
more children respectively; itHC is a vector of human capital variables, namely, work 
experience, experience squared, education and tenure with the current employer; itJC  is a 
vector of job characteristics, namely, part-time and casual employment status, industry, 
occupation, sector, firm size and union membership; itMS  is a vector of dummy variables 
representing marital status, namely, partnered and separated; tYear  is a vector of year 
dummies; i  is an individual specific intercept; and itu  is a random error term.  
To remove the individual specific intercepts i , and hence control for time invariant 
unobserved characteristics, the variables in Equation 1 are demeaned, obtaining fixed effects 
estimates of the motherhood wage differential. A significantly negative (positive) 1  
indicates that there is a residual motherhood wage penalty (premium). Since itChild1 and 
itChild2  are equal to one if the woman has one or more children and two or more children 
respectively, the coefficient 2  gives the incremental effect of a second child.
8
  
To understand whether the wage differential arises immediately after birth or develops 
over time through wage growth, the methodology of Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009, 
pp.331-333) is employed.  













where itHC  represents education and tenure, with experience ( itExp ) and the quadratic 
in experience ( 2itExp ) included separately. In addition to 1itChild  and 2itChild , two 
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 To test for selection bias a Heckman selection model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.542-543) is estimated 
with the pooled sample using maximum likelihood estimation (see Table A.1, Appendix B for results). Non-
labour income is used as an exclusion restriction following other studies (such as Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Kimmel, 2005; Baum, 2002; Booth and Wood, 2008; Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999; Korenman and 
Neumark, 1992; Krepp, 2007). Since self-employed women are excluded from the sample, the selection 
correction accounts for selection into being an employee rather than employment in general. 
(Equation 2) 
variables 1itYChild  and 2itYChild are included which count the number of years since 
returning to the workforce after giving birth to the first and second child respectively (equal 
to one in the first year of return to work after birth).
9
 Moreover, itGap , which measures the 
number of years not in the labour force around the first and second births, is included to 
capture the effect of human capital depreciation.
10
  
In this specification, motherhood is allowed to affect both wage levels and wage growth. 










542   . The effect of the birth on subsequent annual wage growth is 
given by 3b  for a first child and 4b  gives the incremental effect of additional children.  
As well as allowing the wage equation to have separate intercepts ( i ) the above model 
also allows different slopes in experience ( i ) for each individual, enabling individual 
specific unobserved factors to affect both wage levels and wage growth.  
By taking first-differences of each variable and assuming that experience increases by 
one every year, we obtain:
11
 
                                                 
9
 Instead of constructing first-differences of YChild1 and YChild2 and dividing by the number of years 
between interviews, this paper follows Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) in using the conceptually 
equivalent Child1 and Child2 variables instead. Child1 and Child2 are the more reliable measure as the 
information required to construct YChild1 and YChild2 is not available in the general release HILDA data. 
10
 For women who gave birth and had an employment break, itGap is set equal to the number of waves not 
working, and remains at this value in the years thereafter. The coefficient 5 is constrained to be the same for 
first and second children. 
11
 In the panel used by Loughran and Zissimopolous, individuals are not observed every year so experience 
does not necessarily increase by one between observations. To account for this, Loughran and Zissimopoulos 
re-introduce the square of experience in Equations 3 and 4 and divide the change in the log wage, experience 
and experience squared by the time elapsed between the respondent‟s interviews. Instead of diverging from the 
specifications, the sample and experience measure used in this paper to estimate Equations 3 and 4 will be 
constructed in such a way to ensure that experience increases by one between wage observations. In doing so, 
it is not necessary to include any additional variables in Equations 3 or 4, or to divide any variables by the time 











where  2 . The time invariant i  has been removed, however the effect of unobserved 
heterogeneity on wage growth, i , remains. This allows for the possibility that wages have 
different growth rates over time for different individuals. If unobserved productivity traits 
such as career motivation are positively correlated with wage growth and also induce 
women to delay or forego childbearing, coefficients 41b  will be negatively biased. 
Similarly, if there are unobserved factors which increase wage growth and induce women to 
become mothers 41b  will be positively biased. Demeaning Equation 3 eliminates i , 
obtaining a first-difference with fixed effects model: 
   
   
     





















Estimation results will be presented for Equation 1 (as a pooled cross-section and with fixed 
effects), Equation 3 (first-difference) and Equation 4 (first-difference with fixed effects). 
IV. DATA 
The wage equations are estimated using unit-record data from the first seven waves 
(2001-2007) of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
survey.
12
 Over the seven waves of HILDA, a total of 9,792 women were surveyed resulting 
in 47,727 woman-year observations.
13
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 Table A1 defines the variables used.  
13




Sample Construction: Remaining Woman-Year Observations 
Sample A:  
Women 47 727 
Aged between 21 and 52 26 849 
Employed 19 529 
Employees (not self-employed) 17 131 
Not studying full time 16 550 
Not missing wage data  16 412 
Not an outlying wage 16 272 
Not inconsistent child data 16 195 
No deceased children 15 953 
Not missing human capital data 15 478 
Not missing job characteristic data 14 975 
Not missing marital status 14 972 
Sample B:  
Part of a valid block encompassing 3 or more wages  11 683 
Dropping the first observation from each block in making 
first-differences 
9 365 
Ratio of consecutive wages no more than 1.5 7 989 
 
To estimate the effect of motherhood on wages (Equation 1) the sample is restricted to 
women between the ages of 21 and 52.
14
 Since each woman-year observation must have a 
valid wage rate, 7,320 observations in which a woman was unemployed or out of the labour 
force were dropped. Other observations were excluded if the woman was self-employed, in 
full-time education, or had missing or in-consistent data.
15
 Furthermore, outlying wage 
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 Women aged 21 years or less were excluded as wage rates of young workers are generally determined by 
junior pay rate scales and as such, do not reflect individual worker productivity. A further 2,549 women older 
than the usual childbearing age-range were also dropped. Inspection of the HILDA data shows that pregnancy 
rates fall greatly beyond the age of 45. To allow a woman aged close to 45 to have a child in the first of 
HILDA and be included in the sample in the waves that follow, only women aged 52 years or older were 
excluded. 
15
 The self-employed were excluded as their wages are not determined in the same way as employees. Full-
time students were excluded as their decisions about occupations and wage contracts are likely to differ from 
individual‟s no longer in full-time education. Observations were excluded if the total number of children the 
woman currently has exceeded the total number of children ever given birth to or adopted. This should not 
occur as foster and step children are not counted as children currently have in HILDA. Women with deceased 
children were also dropped as they may have wage effects stemming from childbearing and rearing in the past 
and therefore differ to women who have never had children. Observations with missing data on salary or hours 
worked, human capital, job characteristics or marital status were excluded.  
observations in the top or bottom 0.5 percent of the remaining sample were excluded.
16
 
After applying all restrictions, a sample of 4,255 women (2,596 with one or more children, 
1,998 with two or more children) making 14,972 woman-year observations was obtained 
(Sample A). Descriptive statistics for Sample A are provided in Table 2. 
To estimate Equations 3 and 4, the change in each variable between the years a woman is 
working must be constructed. To ensure that experience changes by (around) one year 
between consecutive wage observations (as required to obtain Equation 3) first-differences 
are not taken over non-responding years. Instead, „blocks‟ of consecutive years are 
identified where a woman was working and had a valid wage observation or was not 
employed.
17
 To be included in the sample, each woman must have a valid block of 
responding years encompassing at least three wage observations to allow first-differences to 
be constructed, and the first-difference with fixed effects model to be estimated.
18
 Excluding 
outlying wage growth observations where the ratio of consecutive wages exceeded a factor 
of 1.5, a final sample of 2,247 women making 7,989 woman-year observations remained 
(1,460 with one or more children, 1,137 with two or more children). In this sample, a total 
of 132 first births and 96 second births were observed (Sample B).
19
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 Testing revealed the results are generally insensitive to the wage cut-off chosen, and changing the wage cut-
off has little effect on the conclusions drawn.  
17
 This method should ensure that for the women in the sample, experience does not increase in the years no 
wage is observed. 
18
 To make full use of the data, additional second blocks were identified. 82 women have 2 valid blocks 
(Waves 1-3 and Waves 5-7). First-differences are only taken within each block, that is, not across waves 5 and 
3. 
19
 That is, any wage which increased by more than 50 percent or decreased by more than one third was 
excluded. This corresponds to a change in the natural log of the hourly wage of  0.405. As discussed in 
Section VI, the results are sensitive to outlying wage growth observations.  
TABLE 2 




  Mother 
Non- 
Mother 
Hourly wage 22.22 22.36  Industry Continued    
Log-hourly wage 3.03 3.04  Construction 0.04 0.04  
Age (years) 40.62 30.29 *** Retail/Hospitality 0.20 0.19  
Experience (years) 18.20 11.08 *** Transport 0.02 0.02  
Tenure (years) 6.03 4.29 *** Culture 0.03 0.06 *** 
Education    Finance/Science 0.11 0.21 *** 
Post-Graduate 0.10 0.13 *** Education/Health 0.49 0.37 *** 
Bachelor Degree 0.17 0.30 *** Other (Omitted) 0.03 0.03  
Diploma 0.10 0.13 *** Sector    
Certificate 0.17 0.12 *** Private Sector 0.56 0.62 *** 
Year 12 0.16 0.19 *** Public Sector 0.33 0.28 *** 
Year 11 (Omitted) 0.30 0.12 *** Other (Omitted) 0.11 0.10  
Occupation    Firm Size    
Manager 0.07 0.08  Small  0.24 0.22 ** 
Professional 0.26 0.36 *** Medium (Omitted) 0.13 0.14  
Trade 0.04 0.05 ** Large 0.62 0.64  
Community 0.16 0.09 *** Other Job Characteristics    
Clerical 0.27 0.27  Part-time Worker 0.54 0.18 *** 
Sales 0.10 0.09  Casual Worker 0.27 0.17 *** 
Machinery 0.02 0.01 * Union member 0.30 0.27 *** 
Labourer (Omitted) 0.09 0.05 *** Marital Status    
Industry    Partnered 0.80 0.49 *** 
Primary 0.01 0.00 ** Separated 0.15 0.03 *** 
Utilities/Mining 0.00 0.01 *** Never Married 0.04 0.48 *** 
Manufacturing 0.06 0.07  (Omitted)    
Source: HILDA, Waves 1-7 
Notes: *,**,** means mothers and non-mothers are statistically different at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
levels of significance. Means are weighted by cross-sectional probability weights 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The pooled cross-sectional model reveals no significant raw wage differential between 
mothers and non-mothers (Table 3).
20
 However, as mothers in the sample are older, and 
consequently have more years of experience than non-mothers, a significant eight percent 
penalty arises when controlling for experience. The penalty becomes small (around two 
percent) and insignificant when controlling for education and tenure. There continues to be 
no significant difference between mothers‟ and non-mothers‟ wages until controls are 
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 All models presented are un-weighted. There are no appropriate probability weights available for an 
unbalanced panel (using fixed effects and first difference estimation). Applying cross-sectional responding 
person weights to the pooled cross-sectional model has little effect on the estimates (results available on 
request).  
included for marital status. In the final model, there remains a significant residual wage 
penalty of 2.7 percent for one child, and no incremental penalty for additional children.  
A Heckman-corrected wage model (Table A.1, Appendix B) shows significant evidence 
of selection bias, with the Heckman-corrected motherhood penalty estimate for one child 
larger (by around 2.6 percentage points) than the pooled OLS results. This suggests that 
mothers most likely to suffer a wage penalty are less likely to be employed, and therefore 
failure to account for selection into employment will understate the true motherhood wage 
penalty.  
The fixed effects estimates show no significant motherhood penalty controlling for 
human capital variables. However when part-time and casual status are added, a significant 
five percent penalty for one child, and four percent penalty for two or more 
children (significant at the ten percent level) appears, reflecting the large premium to part-
time employment for Australian women (Table A.1, Appendix B).
21
 This contrasts results 
for Britain and the United States which found part-time work to be a source of the 
motherhood penalty (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999, Waldfogel, 1997).  
Including other job characteristics and marital status has an immaterial effect on the 
motherhood coefficient. With all controls included, the fixed effects results show mothers 
with one child receive a five percent penalty while mothers of two or more children earn 
around nine percent less than non-mothers on average, even after controlling for observable 
and time-invariant unobservable differences.
22
 These penalties are similar to the unweighted 
Heckman-corrected pooled estimates providing some evidence that selection into 
employment may be accounted for by fixed effects.  
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 A part-time wage premium is in line with the findings of Booth and Wood (2008) 
22
 Fixed effects models were estimated allowing for interaction between motherhood and professional 
occupation, partnered and part-time status (results not shown). None of the interaction terms however were 
significant suggesting that the motherhood penalty is not statistically different across marital, part-time work 
and professional occupation status. 
 
TABLE 3 
Pooled Cross-Section OLS 















 -0.022 -0.022 -0.013 -0.014 -0.027
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 (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Child2 -0.006 -0.026 -0.009 -0.009 -0.020 -0.018 -0.023 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
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 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Child2 -0.041 -0.033 -0.032 -0.042 -0.041 -0.040 -0.039
 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
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Source: HILDA, Waves 1-7  
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; standard errors are in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. The dependant variable is the 
natural log of the hourly wage in constant 2007 dollars. All regressions correspond to Equation 1. Child1 is the estimated effect of motherhood on log wages 
of the first child;Child2 gives the incremental effect of a second child. Regressions are not weighted. Full results for final model reported in Table A.1, 
Appendix B. 
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This implies that mothers do not differ from non-mothers on unobservable productivity 
traits, other than those which affect selection into employment.  
The residual wage penalty is consistent with a „tired mother‟ effect whereby mothers 
have less energy to devote to work. Alternatively, motherhood may have no causal 
effect on productivity, yet a wage penalty arises through „taste‟ discrimination or an 
(inaccurate) perception by employers that mothers are less productive.  
The penalty estimates are similar to some observed for the United States (Lundberg 
and Rose, 2000; Waldfogel, 1997; Waldfogel, 1998b) however are larger than estimates 
for Denmark (Gupta and Smith, 2002) and other American results (Anderson, Binder 




To determine whether the wage differential arises immediately after the birth of a 
child, or reflects the effect of motherhood on wage growth, Equations 3 and 4 have been 
estimated. The first-difference results reveal that having a first or second child has no 
immediate effect on the wage level (Table 4). Across all sets of control variables, the 
average effect of having a child in the first year of return to work is close to zero and 
not statistically significant. Contrary to prior expectations of a negative effect, the 
coefficient of Gap is not statistically different from zero. 
In contrast, the coefficient of YChild1 shows that having a first child significantly 
reduces wage growth. After the birth of a first child, annual wage growth is reduced by 
one percentage point (p<0.05). The coefficient of YChild2 shows an offsetting positive 
effect of a second child on wage growth, however is not significant at conventional 
                                                 
23
 This result stands in contrast to prior Australian studies which found no significant residual motherhood 
wage penalty (Krepp, 2007; Whitehouse, 2002). The difference does not appear to be due to unobserved 
heterogeneity as a significant motherhood wage penalty was also found in the pooled cross-sectional 
model. As such, the contrasting results are likely to be due to differences in the way mothers are defined, 
sample composition, the time periods covered and the controls included in the models. 
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levels. Altogether, the first-difference model suggests that the wage differential between 
mothers and non-mothers has come about through a reduction in wage growth, rather 
than an immediate fall in the wage level after birth. Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009) 
found the opposite result for the United States finding motherhood reduces wages by 
two percent in the year of birth, and has no significant effect on subsequent wage 
growth  
The first difference with fixed effects model was estimated to account for the effect 
of unobserved heterogeneity on wage growth (Table 5). The immediate effects of 
motherhood on the wage level remain generally the same. In contrast, allowing for 
individual slopes in experience has a large impact on the effect of motherhood on wage 
growth. The point estimates show having a first child reduces wages by 3.5 percent per 
year and having a second child increases annual wage growth by around 4.5 percentage 
points. However, the standard errors are much larger in Equation 4 rendering the effect 
of a first child insignificant, and the effect of a second child only significant at the ten 
percent level.  
The dissimilarity of the Equation 3 and 4 point estimates may be due to the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity on wage growth, which is only controlled for in the latter 
model. A comparison of the coefficients suggests that those women with wage-growth 
enhancing unobserved traits are more likely to have a first child, but less likely to have a 
second. However, since these effects are only marginally significant at best, there may 
be no systematic effect on wage growth when unobserved factors are taken into account.  
Further analysis reveals that while the first-difference model (Equation 3) is 
relatively insensitive to the inclusion of large wage-growth observations, the first-
difference with fixed effects model (Equation 4) shows very large and opposing impacts
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TABLE 4 
First Difference  
N = 7989 (2247) 















Child1 ( 1b ) 0.036
*
 0.034 0.018 0.018 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Child2 ( 2b ) -0.019 -0.021 -0.034 -0.033 -0.034 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Gap ( 5 ) - - 0.038 0.039 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.033 
   (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Effect of Motherhood on Wage Growth 















 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
YChild2 ( 4b ) 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 





531    0.0218 0.022 0.030 0.031 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.006 





542    -0.013 -0.015 0.030 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
R
2 


















Source: HILDA, Waves 1-7  
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; standard errors are in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. The dependant variable, the natural log 




531   gives the estimated average effect of motherhood on log wages in the year of returning to work after the birth of the first child where 




542   and 4b  give the incremental 
effect of a second child on wage levels and wage growth where 2ndGap is equal to 0.59. In regressions where Gap is not controlled for, the immediate effects 
for a first and second child are 31 bb  and 42 bb   respectively.  
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TABLE 5 
First Difference with Fixed Effects 
N = 7989 (2247) 


















 0.039 0.039 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Child2 ( 2b ) -0.033 -0.033 -0.045 -0.044 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Gap ( 5 ) - - 0.039 0.039 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.034 
   (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Effect of Motherhood on Wage Growth 
YChild1 ( 3b ) -0.037 -0.036 -0.034 -0.035 -0.032 -0.034 -0.033 -0.035 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
YChild2  ( 4b ) 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.045 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 





531    
0.018 0.018 0.030 0.029 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 





542    
0.015 0.015 0.026 0.026 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) 
R
2 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.023 0.023 0.023 









Source: HILDA, Waves 1-7  
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; standard errors are in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. The dependant variable, the natural log 




531   gives the estimated average effect of motherhood on log wages in the year of returning to work after the birth of the first child where 




542   and 4b  give the incremental 
effect of a second child on wage levels and wage growth where 2ndGap is equal to 0.59. In regressions where Gap is not controlled for, the immediate effects 
for a first and second child are 31 bb  and 42 bb   respectively.   
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of a first and second child on wage growth, which are inconsistent with the motherhood 
penalties presented in Table 2 (Table A.2, Appendix B). In estimating the latter model 
for the United States with the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) data sets, Loughran 
and Zissimopoulos (2009) reported no such sensitivity. It appears that the first-
difference with fixed effects specification is too demanding for seven waves of HILDA 
data used and requires a longer panel to obtain precise results. 
The sample sizes reported in Table A.2 show that a large portion of women have 
large year-to-year wage changes. The source of these large changes is unclear, however 
given the sensitivity of the results, they are presumably not explained by the variables 
included in the model.  
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Holding observable and unobservable differences constant, fixed effects estimates 
reveal mothers with one child earn around five percent less than non-mothers on 
average, with a further four percent penalty for a second child. This residual wage 
penalty may be due to actual productivity differences if responsibility for children 
leaves mothers with less energy to exert at work. Alternatively, mothers may be paid 
less than non-mothers because employers perceive mothers to be less productive or have 
a „taste‟ for discriminating against them.  
Contrary to studies overseas, part-time employment was not found to be a source of 
the motherhood wage penalty. Similarly, the propensity of mothers to work in certain 
occupations, industries and sectors explains little of the gap.  
The first-difference results (Equation 3) show a first or second child has no 
immediate effect on wages in the first year of returning to work, but a first child reduces 
subsequent annual wage growth by one percentage point. Sensitivity tests showed these 
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results are relatively robust to large wage changes. The first difference with fixed-
effects (Equation 4) results however proved much more sensitive to outliers.  
Overall, the wage growth analysis suggests that the motherhood penalty emerges 
through reduced wage growth, rather than an immediate wage decline after birth. This is 
consistent with Australian maternity leave legislation which entitles most women to 
return to their prior position with their pre-birth employer and thus wages may be 
unaffected in the short-term. However subsequent wage growth may be reduced if the 
presence of children reduces mothers‟ actual or perceived productivity, or if employers 
have a taste for discrimination. Moreover, a reduction in wage growth is also consistent 
with flatter wage profiles for part-time workers. 
As such, policies which make combining work and motherhood easier are likely to 
improve Australian mothers‟ wages and wage growth relative to non-mothers‟. Greater 
access to childcare services, particularly in the workplace, may improve women‟s 
ability, and employer‟s perception of their ability, to balance family and work. 
Moreover, practices which improve career advancement of part-time workers are likely 
to increase mothers‟ wage growth. 
Future research may estimate the motherhood penalty using instrumental variables 
techniques; as more waves of data become available in HILDA, instruments used 
overseas such as sibling sex-mix may be feasible. A longer panel may also render the 
first-difference with fixed effects specification more robust. Given the sensitivity of the 
wage growth results and the large proportion of women with large year-to-year wage 
changes, further investigation into the source of outlying wage trajectories is warranted.  
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 Description of Variables 
 
Hourly Wage. Usual weekly gross wages and salary in the main job divided by the 
hours per week usually worked in the main job. Nominal wages are converted to 2007 
dollars.  
Child Variables. A mother is defined as a woman with one or more natural or adopted, 
resident or non-resident living children of any age. Children who have since died, foster 
children and step children are not counted when constructing the 1Child  and 2Child .  
Experience (Equations 1 and 2). Equations 1 and 2 use the HILDA variable for work 
experience which measures time (expressed in years) spent in paid work in all jobs, 
part-time or full-time, since finishing full-time education for the first time.  
Experience (Equations 3 and 4). In the way the sample is constructed, actual 
experience increases by approximately one year between wage observations. However 
due to differences in the interview dates, and incomplete work years, most changes in 
experience are slightly more or less than one. Since the econometric specification 
requires that experience increases by exactly one each year, experience has been 
constructed which equals actual experience in the first year, and increases by one each 
working year thereafter. The constructed and HILDA experience variables are strongly 
correlated ( 99.0 ). 
Education. The highest education level achieved: 
Post Grad  = Doctorate, Masters, Graduated Diploma or Graduate Certificate 
Bachelor  = Bachelor Degree 
Diploma  = Diploma or Advanced Diploma 
Certificate  = Certificate I, II, III, IV or undefined certificate level 
Yr 12   = Year 12 
Yr 11  = Year 11 or below 
Tenure. Time (expressed in years) spent working with the current employer. 
Part-time. Part-time employees are those working fewer than 35 hours per week. 
Casual. Casual workers are those receiving no paid holiday or pay sick leave.   
Industry: The Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification 
(ANZSIC) classification is used: 
Primary  = Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
Util/Mining = Electricity, Gas, Water, Waste Services and Mining 
Manufacture = Manufacturing 
Construction  = Construction and Wholesale Trade 
Ret/Hosp = Retail Trade, Accommodation, Food Services and Administration 
Transport = Transport, Postal and Warehousing 
Culture = Information, Media, Telecommunications, Arts and Recreation 
Fin/Science = Financial, Insurance, Rental, Hiring, Real Estate, Professional, 
Scientific and Technical Services 
Educ/Health  = Public Administration and Safety, Education and Training, Health Care 
and Social Assistance 
Other  = Other Services 
Occupation: The Australia and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ANZSCO) is used: 
Managers  = Managers 
Professionals  = Professionals 
Trade   = Technicians and Trade Workers 
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Community  = Community and Personal Services Work 
Clerical = Clerical and Administrative Workers 
Sales  = Sales Workers 
Machinery = Machinery Operators and Drivers 
Labourers = Labourers 
Sector. Sector is defined as:  
Private = Private for Profit Organisation 
Public  = Government Enterprise or Organisation 
Other = Private not-for-profit Organisation, Other Commercial, Other Non-
Commercial 
Firm Size. The number of people employed by the respondent‟s employer at locations 
throughout Australia is used as the measure of firm size. If respondent‟s indicated that 
their firm only operated from their workplace, the number of employees at their place of 
work was used:  
Small  = < 20 employees 
Medium = 20-99 employees, including those who responded “don‟t know but 
more than 20” to the question of number of employees at place of work, 
and those who responded “don‟t know but less than 100” to the question 
of number of employees in locations around Australia. 
Large = >100 employees 
Union Status. Union members 
Marital Status. Marital status categories are: 
Partnered = Married and De facto 
Separated = Divorced, Separated or Widowed 
Never  = Never Married and not De-facto 
Non-Labour Income. A woman‟s financial year wages and salary was subtracted from 
the household financial year income (excluding windfall gains), and the result divided 
by the number of adult equivalents in the household. 
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APPENDIX B 
 Estimation Results 
 
TABLE A.1 













 -0.005 0.020 





 -0.039 -0.033 -0.045 






































 0.035 0.033 0.036 
Certificate 0.023 0.035
**









































 0.014 0.001 -0.015 





 -0.010 0.020 0.016 










 0.026 0.020 0.014 






































 -0.014 -0.028 -0.031 






















 -0.001 -0.000 


































N (Censored) 14972 14972 14972 7989 7989 
N (Uncensored)  8347    
Log L  -17104.7
***
    
   0.080    
   0.248    
Wald 2   16.84
***
    
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors are used; standard errors are in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 
0.001. Year dummies are included in all models. Log L is the log pseudolikelihood.  is the estimated inverse Mill‟s 
ratio.   is the estimated correlation between the wage and employment equation error terms. 2 is the chi squared 
value from a Wald test of independence of the wage and selection equations ( 0 : 0H   ).  
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TABLE A.2 
 Wage Growth Cut-off 
Observations with wage growth in excess of this were dropped 
 0.182 0.405 0.693 0.916 
First-Difference (Equation 3) 
Effect of Motherhood on Wage Growth 
YChild1 ( 3b ) -0.001 -0.010
*
 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
YChild2  ( 4b ) -0.000 0.006 0.008 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 





531    
-0.014 0.006 -0.022 -0.027 





542    
-0.018 -0.007 0.027 0.026 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.029) (0.033) 
First-Difference with Fixed effects (Equation 4) 
Effect of Motherhood on Wage Growth 





 (0.019) (0.023) (0.033) (0.035) 





 (0.021) (0.027) (0.035) (0.037) 





531    
-0.009 0.006 -0.059 -0.055 





542    
0.012 0.020 0.065 0.094 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.014) (0.048) 
N (Total Observations) 5553 7989 8948 9159 
N (First Births) 76 132 162 167 
N (Second Births) 66 96 119 126 






p<0.001. The dependant variable, the natural log of the hourly wage, and all regressors, 
are in first-difference form as specified in Equations 3 and 4.  All regressions include full controls and are 
unweighted.  
 
